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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO
COUNSEL-STANDARD FOR JUDGING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF ASSISTANCE
Frankie Thomas was stopped by police officers as he left a
hotel carrying a large plastic bag. The officers observed that
Thomas had been drinking, and even though they later admitted
he was not sufficiently inebriated to sustain the charge, they ar-
rested him for intoxication. Incident to that arrest, the officers
searched the bag and found merchandise from a nearby depart-
ment store. This led to the discovery of a previously undiscovered
break-in. Thomas was then arrested a second time for possession
of stolen property and indicted for breaking and entering. Because
he was an indigent, the court appointed counsel to represent him
at trial.
Thomas was convicted of breaking and entering in the Inter-
mediate Court of Mercer County. During the trial, the prosecution
introduced the evidence seized in the initial search and cross-
examined the defendant extensively as to prior convictions and
charges of collateral crimes. His appointed counsel did not object.
Furthermore, counsel neglected to move for a directed verdict at
the close of the state's evidence, failed to assign grounds support-
ing a motion to set aside the verdict and award a new trial, and
did not properly process an appeal. In a subsequent habeus corpus
proceeding, the intermediate court found no errors in the trial and
resentenced Thomas to the same term. The legal effect of that
resentencing order was a new appeal period.' From a final order of
the circuit court of Mercer County denying his petition, Thomas
appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Held,
reversed and remanded. In a unanimous decision, the court found
that Thomas had not received effective assistance of counsel and
had, therefore, been denied a fair trial. The court held that trial
counsel effectiveness must be determined by comparing the degree
of skill afforded at trial with the degree of skill normally exhibited
by attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal prac-
tice. State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
The court's opinion, written by Justice Haden, clarified exist-
A final judgment of a statutory court in a habeus corpus proceeding may be
appealed to a circuit court. A final order of the circuit court rejecting such an appeal
may be appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals within the time limit for civil
appeals generally. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-4A-9 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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ing law concerning searches incident to arrest' and augmented the
law concerning the use of evidence of collateral crimes and charges
in a criminal prosecution.3 Far more significant, however, are the
principles set forth relative to the right of an accused to the assis-
tance of counsel as guaranteed by the state4 and federaP constitu-
2 The initial arrest, made with knowledge that it could not be sustained, was
clearly illegal. State v. Lutz, 85 W. Va. 303, 101 S.E. 434 (1919). Evidence seized
as a result of an unlawful arrest is equivalent to that seized without a search
warrant or probable cause. State v. Duvernoy, 195 S.E.2d 631 (W. Va. 1973). The
"plain view" exception to the general requirements for a lawful search does not
justify the seizure of evidence unless the officer was lawfully searching at the time.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 404 U.S. 443 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30
(1970); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); State v. Duvernoy, supra. A
person cannot voluntarily consent to a search when he is in custody following an
illegal arrest. Holtzendorf v. State, 125 Ga. App. 747, 188 S.E.2d 879 (1972). The
evidence was therefore inadmissible. State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d at 454 (W. Va.
1974).
Proof that the accused has been convicted of, or charged with, other crimes
is inadmissible for the purpose of showing that the accused committed the crime
charged, unless the other offenses are elements of, or are legally connected with,
the crime. State v. Hudson, 128 W. Va. 655, 656, 37 S.E.2d 553, 557 (1946). This
general rule is subject to certain exceptions. Id. at 663, 37 S.E.2d at 557; State v.
Greene, 122 W. Va. 51, 54, 7 S.E.2d 96, 92 (1940). According to Thomas, the
evidence is admissible if it tends to establish motive, intent, the absence of mistake
or accident, a close relation in a common scheme or plan, or the identity of the
person charged. 203 S.E.2d at 455. In State v. Wilson, 207 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1974),
the court cites Thomas but seems to follow an earlier decision under which the other
crimes must be similar or near in point of time to the crime charged, must have
some reasonable relation to the crime, and tend to show a common scheme or plan.
Trial courts must exercise discretion in determining whether the harmfulness of
such evidence outweighs its probative value. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 303
(1942). The scope and latitude given to the prosecutor can deny the defendant a
fair trial. State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d at 456.
'W. VA. CONST. art. Ell, § 14:
Trials of crimes, and misdemeanors, unless herein otherwise provided,
shall be by a jury of twelve men, public, without unreasonable delay, and
in the county where the alleged offence was committed, unless upon
petition of the accused, and for good cause shown, it is removed to some
other county. In all such trials, the accused shall be fully and plainly
informed of the character and cause of the accusation, and be confronted
with the witnesses against him, and shall have the assistance of counsel,
and a reasonable time to prepare for his defence; and there shall be
awarded to him compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
(emphasis added).
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
[Vol. 77
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tions. In Thomas, the first West Virginia case voiding a conviction
because counsel did not perform satisfactorily, the court glosses
over traditional standards and adopts an approach that will re-
quire considerably greater competence for criminal defense attor-
neys.
In early decisions considering the right to counsel, the West
Virginia court reasoned that a waiver of the right to counsel was
presumed where the accused failed to request assistance or entered
a guilty plea.6 Later decisions, the most influential of which was
State ex rel. May v. Boles, eliminated any presumption' and held
that: (1) the protections of the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution are obligatory upon the states under the due
process clause;9 (2) the right to counsel is a fundamental right, an
essential element of a fair trial;1" and (3) the accused is entitled to
assistance at every stage where his substantial rights may be af-
fected." The court has recognized that the right to the assistance
of counsel includes the right to effective assistance," but Thomas
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
(emphasis added).
I In State v. Kellison, 56 W. Va. 690, 692, 47 S.E. 166, 167 (1904), the court
stated that since the assistance of counsel is not a prerequisite to a conviction, and
since there is a presumption of regularity in trial proceedings, there is no denial of
the right to assistance of counsel absent some affirmative showing. Similarly, in
State v. Yoes, 67 W. Va. 546, 547, 68 S.E. 181 (1910), the court spoke of the right
to assistance as a "mere privilege ... permissive and conditional upon the pleasure
of the accused," and held that a request for assistance must appear on the record
if an invasion of the guarantee is to be proven.
7 149 W. Va. 155, 139 S.E.2d 177 (1964), commented on in 67 W. VA. L. REv.
234 (1965).
8 The right to assistance of counsel may be waived, but the waiver must be
competently and intelligently made. E.g., State ex rel. Fountain v. King, 149 W.
Va. 511, 142 S.E.2d 59 (1965). A waiver will never be presumed.
O E.g., State ex rel. Widmyer v. Boles, 150 W. Va. 109, 144 S.E.2d 322 (1965);
State ex rel. Browning v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 181, 139 S.E.2d 263 (1964).
"1 E.g., State ex rel. Waugh v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 525, 142 S.E.2d 62 (1965);
State ex tel. Stumbo v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 174, 139 S.E.2d 259 (1964).
" State ex tel. Riffle v. Thorn, 153 W. Va. 76 168 S.E.2d 810 (1969).
02 To assure that the defendant receives effective assistance, counsel must be
given sufficient time to adequately prepare for trial. State ex tel. Favors v. Tucker,
143 W. Va. 130, 100 S.E.2d 411 (1957). In State ex rel. West Virginia-Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Eno, 135 W. Va. 473, 63 S.E.2d 845 (1951), the court held that the
defendants were denied a fair trial when the trial court refused to grant a continu-
ance so that counsel would have time to prepare a defense.
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is the first attempt to actually define "effectiveness."
Other courts have been unusually strict, insisting that a con-
viction cannot be vacated unless counsel's errors were so blatant
that the entire trial was reduced to a mockery or a farce." Relief
has been granted only when the conduct of defense counsel
shocked the conscience of the reviewing court, that is, when coun-
sel's performance was in bad faith, a sham, or a pretense. In juris-
dictions using these criteria, effectiveness of assistance has become
primarily a question of procedure, not a test of competence."
In Thomas, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals re-
jected the stringent mockery-farce concepts and concluded that
"effectiveness" refers to an evaluation of defense counsel's per-
formance vis-a-vis his contemporaries. According to Thomas, a
criminal defendant in West Virginia has a constitutional right to
be represented by an attorney who exhibits "the normal and cus-
tomary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are reasonably
knowledgeable of criminal law.' 5 One commentator cited by the
court has argued that a comparative standard is necessary to safe-
guard the guilt-determining process and is, therefore, more consis-
tent with the policies underlying the sixth amendment."
The language used in Thomas is comparable to that found in
two federal cases that apparently influenced the Supreme Court of
Appeals. 17 West Virginia's standard, however, is distinguishable in
11 E.g., United States ex rel. Marcelin v. Mancusi, 462 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1972).
Virginia courts apply this strict standard. E.g., Hem v. Cox, 212 Va. 644, 186 S.E.2d
85 (1972).
,1 It is clear . . . that the term "effective" has been used by the
Supreme Court to describe a procedural requirement, as contrasted with
a standard of skill. The Court has never held that an accused is entitled
to representation by a lawyer meeting a designated aptitude test. It has
never used the term to refer to the quality of service rendered by a lawyer.
Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
s 203 S.E.2d at 461.
Is The reliability of verdicts depends . . .on the prosecution meeting
the burden of proof imposed on it. Effective opposing counsel is necessary
to ensure that the burden is properly met .... Best suited to protect the
policies embodied in the sixth amendment right to effective representa-
tion is the standard of ordinary skill and care ....
Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures From
Habeus Corpus, 59 VA. L. Rlv. 927, 936 (1973).
,7 In Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970), it was held that the
proper standard of adequacy is the "customary.skill and knowledge which normally
prevails at the time and place." Another court described the standard as "the usual
[Vol. 77
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol77/iss2/6
CASE COMMENTS
one important respect: the skill and knowledge required are those
that prevail among lawyers who are fairly proficient and experi-
enced in criminal practice, not the skill and knowledge that can
be expected of lawyers in general. Criminal practice is a particu-
larly technical specialty within the profession. The services of a
highly skilled corporate or tax attorney may not be effective in a
criminal trial."8
The standard adopted in Thomas is a familiar one for judging
the actions of any person who undertakes the practice of a profes-
sion. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that attorneys,
as well as physicians, surgeons, accountants, and so forth, must
"exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members
of that profession. . . in good standing in similar communities."19
Justice Haden notes in the court's opinion that the Thomas stan-
dard resembles the one applied to a physician's conduct in a mal-
practice case."0 In West Virginia, a physician is bound to act with
the same reasonable and ordinary skill and diligence as practiced
by physicians in the same line of practice in similar localities.21
"Effectiveness," as defined in Thomas, however, does not allow for
differences in competence between dissimilar communities; the
same degree of expertise is required of every practitioner.
In managing the strategic aspects of a defense, counsel must
often select a single course of action from several plausible alterna-
tives. Courts examining claims of ineffective assistance should rec-
ognize such a decision as a valid exercise of professional judg-
ment. Accordingly, the court in Thomas insists upon a narrow
amount of skill and judgment exhibited by an attorney conscientiously seeking to
protect his client's interests." Kott v. Green, 303 F. Supp. 821, 822 (N.D. Ohio
1968).
11 "For ordinary skill and care to be the measure, it must be the skill and care
of a competent criminal lawyer." Bines, supra note 16, at 939.
11 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRs § 299A (1965). The comments accompany-
ing this section offer some guidelines for the evaluation of counsel's conduct. They
describe the minimum competence that must be demonstrated as something less
than that of the average member of the profession yet still a "special form of
competence" acquired through particular training and experience.
203 S.E.2d at 459.
2, Vaughan v. Memorial Hosp., 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S.E. 481 (1925). He is not
liable for mere mistakes of judgment unless they are so gross as to be inconsistent
with ordinary skill and care. Id. If a physician employs a method established and
approved by other physicians in the community, he has performed his duty; he is
not bound at his peril to adopt the best available method. Browning v. Hoffman,
86 W. Va. 468, 103 S.E. 484 (1920).
21 Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965); In re Ernst, 294 F.2d 556 (3d
5
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standard of review when the conduct in question arises from an
arguable situation. Tactics are grounds for reversal only if "no
reasonably qualified defense attorney would have so acted in the
defense of an accused." Although a particular act proves to be
detrimental to the defendant's interests, it is constitutionally ade-
quate if it had "any reasonable, tactical or strategic basis." 2' Two
West Virginia cases illustrate this principle. In 1941, the court held
that there was no sixth amendment violation where appointed
counsel chose not to use the majority of the witnesses subpoenaed
and did not argue motions for a new trial and in arrest of
judgment.2 Similarly, a 1958 decision affirmed a murder convic-
tion although trial counsel did not move for a change of venue and
failed to object or take exceptions .2 Other courts have found tacti-
cal justifications where the purported errors of counsel were failure
to make an opening statement,2 to challenge the admissibility of
evidence,2 to cross-examine witnesses, 29 to raise an available de-
fense,3" and to request instructions." These cases, however, should
only have limited value as precedent, because the effectiveness of
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 943 (1961); Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th
Cir. 1961). The West Virginia court has -tated that whether other attorneys may
have followed the same course of action is not the test. State ex reL. Burkhamer v.
Adams, 143 W. Va. 557, 103 S.E.2d 777 (1958).
' 203 S.E.2d at 461.
U Id. at 457.
21 Ex parte Farmer, 123 W. Va. 304, 14 S.E.2d 910 (1941). The attorney found
that most of the subpoenaed witnesses were of no value and knew of no grounds to
assign for the motions.
21 State ex reL. Burkhamer v. Adams, 143 W. Va. 557, 103 S.E.2d 777 (1958).
There was no basis for a motion for a change of venue because a plea of guilty was
to be tendered. Under the circumstances of the case, failure to object or except was
reasonable.
2 Tahl v. O'Connor, 336 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Cal. 1971). Counsel did not want
to reveal the weaknesses in his case at the outset.
21 Barba-Reyes v. United States, 387 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1967). Because the only
defense presented was that the defendant was totally unaware of the presence of
narcotics in his automobile, the decision not to move to suppress the evidence could
be explained strategically.
' Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1962). The court reasoned
that cross-examination would not have been advantageous under the circumstan-
ces.
: Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961). Arguing the defense of
insanity might have undermined the stronger alibi defense.
11 State v. Fulford, 290 Minn. 236, 187 N.W.2d 270 (1971). An instruction
defining a lesser offense could result in a conviction which might not otherwise
occur.
[Vol. 77
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a given course of action depends entirely upon the surrounding
facts and circumstances.32
The issue of effectiveness of counsel arises in two ways. Most
often, counsel's handling of the case is assigned as grounds sup-
porting a petition for a writ of habeus corpus. The petitioner
should pinpoint specific acts or omissions and argue that each of
these is wholly unjustified. In other cases, such as Thomas, ineffec-
tiveness results in a reversal on direct appeal. The burden of proof
is the same in both instances; ineffective assistance must be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence." Proof that some other
tactic would have changed the outcome is insufficient, because "a
defendant is not constitutionally guaranteed such assistance of
counsel as will necessarily result in his acquittal." The court's
opinion cited several cases where other courts have found ineffec-
tive assistance from facts similar to those in Thomas.35 Three of
these define the burden of proof in another way-ineffectiveness is
established by showing either unawareness of, or a misunder-
standing of, a rule of law basic to the case. 6
Finally, if counsel's conduct has been ineffective under the
circumstances but did not contribute to the conviction below, it
will not be grounds for reversal. 7 This "harmless error" exception
is theoretically possible in every case, but, as explained in Thomas,
it will control only when the absence of prejudice is especially
clear. The United States Supreme Court has held that where a
constitutional error has been proven, such as the denial of the right
to effective assistance of counsel, a state court cannot consider the
error as harmless unless the federal standard has been met., Thus,
32 For in-depth analysis of these and other tactical justification cases, see
Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CoRNu L. Rav. 1077 (1973).
1 E.g., State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974); State ex rel. Owens v.
King, 149 W. Va. 637, 142 S.E.2d 880 (1965); State ex rel. Clark v. Adams, 144 W.
Va. 771, 111 S.E.2d 336 (1959).
u 203 S.E.2d at 461.
United States ex rel. Williams v. Brierly, 291 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1964).
- In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1969); People
v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 447 P.2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968); People v. Tbarra,
60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1-2 (1966). Harmless error rules are designed "to
block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any,
likelihood of having changed the result of the trial." Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 20 (1967).
11 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S.
85 (1963).
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if there was any legitimate possibility that counsel's ineffective-
ness was a cause of conviction, the court must conclude that the
trial court lacked valid jurisdiction. 9 The harmless constitutional
error standard is strict; it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court
of Appeals will often find substandard defense work harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
In a criminal trial, conviction or acquittal results from the
adversity of prosecution and defense, and the underlying theory
requires that the adversaries be relatively equal in knowledge and
ability. In Thomas, the court recognizes that the right to assistance
of counsel is empty unless a minimum quality of performance is
guaranteed, and the standard by which it judges effectiveness is
workable. It is, however, only a cautious suggestion, "to be re-
garded as developmental and prospective in nature."4 The pre-
sumption in every case is that defense counsel has made a consci-
entious effort to protect his client's interests, and the court warns
that the new criteria will not tolerate "frivolous" or "unfounded"
appeals.4 It must be remembered that Thomas's counsel made a
series of grievous mistakes that practically assured conviction; the
court can reasonably reject most appeals on the basis of some
tactical justification.
Thomas, most importantly, recognizes a defect in West Vir-
ginia's criminal justice system and calls for reform. At present,
every licensed attorney is entitled to practice in all of the state's
courts, civil and criminal." This is unrealistic and unnecessary. A
competent criminal defense attorney must possess special knowl-
edge and experience; allowing any attorney to do defense work is
analogous to allowing any physician to do surgery. As long as other
specialists, such as corporate or tax attorneys, are permitted to do
criminal work, there will be instances of grossly ineffective assis-
tance similar to that which occurred in Thomas. Thus, the court
defines effectiveness of assistance as ordinary skill within a
specialty, criminal practice. It questions the practice of rotating
court appointments to represent indigent defendants among the
bar without regard to special competence,43 but the same problem
can arise when defense counsel is retained. The court cites Chief
11 203 S.E.2d at 461.
40 Id.
Id.
,2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
203 S.E.2d at 460.
[Vol. 77
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Justice Burger's arguments44 as persuasive and urges that criminal
practice should be formally recognized as a specialty, and that
persons who have been certified as criminal specialists should be
allowed to communicate that status to the general public.
An additional change is also necessary; certification as a crim-
inal specialist should become a prerequisite to practice in West
Virginia's criminal courts. The Supreme Court of Appeals can es-
tablish a system of certification. The licensing statute imposes
upon the court the whole duty of regulating the examination of
applicants for admission to the bar and the granting of licenses.45
The court has held that, beyond the statute, it has the inherent
power to define, supervise, regulate, and control the practice of
law.46 Certification should reflect: (1) formal study of substantive
criminal law and criminal procedure; (2) adequate performance in
examinations designed to measure ability to respond knowledgea-
bly in probable situations; (3) a minimum amount of experience
as an assistant to a qualified specialist; and (4) periodic examina-
tions which will assure that the attorney has kept aware of recent
developments in the law. Persons certified by the court as criminal
specialists could hold themselves out as such to the public without
conflicting with bar association policy. The American Bar Associa-
tion and the West Virginia State Bar recognize that the authority
" What I propose is a broad, four-point program as a first step in
specialist certification. We should:
First: Face up to and reject the notion that every law graduate and
every lawyer is qualified, simply by virtue of admission to the bar, to be
an advocate in trial courts in matters of serious consequence.
Second: Lay aside the proposals for broad and comprehensive spe-
cialty certification ... until we have positive progress in the certification
of the one crucial specialty of trial advocacy that is so basic to a fair
system of justice and has had historic recognition in the common law
systems.
Third: Develop means to evaluate qualifications of lawyers compe-
tent to render the effective assistance of counsel in the trial of cases.
Fourth: Call on the American Bar Association, the Federal Bar Asso-
ciation, the American College of Trial Lawyers, the American Association
of Law Schools, the Federal Judicial Center, the National Center for
State Courts and others to collaborate in prompt and concrete steps to
accomplish certification of trail advocates.
Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification
of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227, 240-41
(1973).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
In re Daniel, 153 W. Va. 839, 173 S.E.2d 153 (1970); West Virginia State Bar
v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959).
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having jurisdiction under state law to control specialization may
prescribe appropriate methods of publicity." The court should, at
least, create a separate listing in telephone directories. Further-
more, certification would require a change in compensation rates
for the representation of indigent defendants; remuneration for
such work should be raised to a realistic amount." These reforms
must be implemented so that West Virginia's criminal justice
system can conform to the Thomas standard.
Rowland H. Burns, Jr.
' ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmnLrY, DR 2-105 (1969); adopted by the
Supreme Court of Appeals, June 9, 1970.
" In West Virginia, a court-appointed defense attorney receives a fee not to
exceed one hundred dollars in a misdemeanor case and not to exceed two hundred
dollars in a felony case. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-1 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The maxi-
mums in federal courts are four hundred dollars and one thousand dollars, and in
protracted cases, the court may award payment in excess of those figures. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (1970).
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